

Cyber Defense Overview

Attack Patterns Aligned to Cyber Kill Chain

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Attackers Leave Trails

Stages of Attack (Cyber kill Chain):

Reconnaissance: gather information on the target
social media, email addresses, intellectual property

Weaponization: trojan coupled with exploitable application
weaponized deliverable: adobe pdf, MS office documents

Delivery: get the weapon to the target environment
email attachments, USB removable media, websites

Exploitation: intruder's code activated, auto-exec'ed by OS?

Installation/spread: backdoor or trojan, persistence
hide existence from security devices

Command & Control: channels to send and receive info

Accomplish Mission: theft of money, theft of IP, destruction
exfiltration: collect, encrypt, extract info from target
use target to compromise other machines

Defender Capabilities

Defensible Actions:

Detect: verify that some attacker is looking around

Deny: prevent the attacker from gaining information

Disrupt: stop or change outbound traffic (to attacker)

Degrade: attack attacker's command & control

Deceive: interfere with command & control

Contain: network segmentation changes

Defender Tools

Mostly Review:

NIDS: Network Intrusion Detection

NIPS: Network Intrusion Prevention

HIDS: Host Intrusion Detection

EPP: Endpoint Protection Platform

Firewall, anti-virus, anti-spyware, behavioral blocking

ACL: Access Control List

AV: anti-virus

DNS Redirect: serve different web page than was requested

Attacker may seek CC channel through page with malware

But redirection may kill this chance

DLP: Data Loss Prevention

Stop exfiltration to untrusted locations, control what data users can transfer

Defender Tools

Mostly Review:

- Tarpit:** purposeful introduction of delays to network traffic
idea: bad guys may give up if things are taking too long
- Honeypot:** seems to belong to but is isolated from network
idea: divert malicious traffic to protect and to discover attack intentions
- chroot jail:** change root directory of current running process
idea: limit access of process to data and software
- Proxy filter:** intermediary for client requests
idea: hide network information from the attacker
- Quality of Service:** classify traffic - how to treat?; level of traffic; check for bottlenecks, selectively drop packets;
- Trust Zones:** level of trust associated with system parts
- Queuing:** form of tarpit on incoming traffic


Defensible Actions Matrix Aligned to the Cyber Kill Chain

| Phase | Detect | Deny | Disrupt | Degrade | Deceive | Contain |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Reconnaissance | Web Analytics | Firewall ACL | | | | Firewall ACL |
| Weaponization | NIDS | NIPS | | | | NIPS |
| Delivery | Vigilant User | Proxy Filter | Inline AV | Queuing | | App-Aware Firewall |
| Exploitation | HIDS | Patch | DEP | | | Inter-Zone NIPS |
| Installation | HIDS | 'chroot' Jail | AV | | | EPP |
| Command & Control | NIDS | Firewall ACL | NIPS | Tarpit | DNS Redirect | Trust Zones |
| Actions on Targets | Audit Logs | Outbound ACL | DLP | Quality of Service | Honeypot | Trust Zones |

Cost to adversary increases as more indicators are revealed, used

From: Defensible Security Posture, Nige the Security Guy

Security Control Types Aligned to the Cyber Kill Chain



Attack Patterns


Indicators:

- any piece of information that describes an intrusion
- **atomic:**
 - ip addresses, email addresses, vulnerability identifiers
- **computed:**
 - * derived from data collected during an incident
 - * e.g. hash values
- **behavioral:**
 - * collections of atomic and computed indicators
 - * AI over the aggregate is used to suggest mal behaviors
 - * rule example:
 - “intruder initially uses a backdoor to generate network traffic matching [regular expression] at the rate of [some frequency] to [some IP address], and then replaces it with a module matching the MD5 hash [value] once access was established”

Attack Patterns

Indicators:

- analysts reveal indicators through analysis or collaboration
- mature indicators by leveraging them in tools
- utilize them when matching activity is discovered
- form additional indicators subject to same actions and states



Attack Patterns

Reconnaissance and weaponization:

- sudden increase in network traffic (analytics/firewall)
- sudden increase in outbound transfers (analytics/firewall)
- unusual patterns of activity (analytics/firewall to stop)
 - * large transfers of data outside normal office hours
 - * large transfers to unusual locations
- unusual searches of directories, files of interest to attacker
 - * source code repositories (NSM/firewall to stop)
- unrecognized, large outbound files that have been compressed, encrypted password-protected
- scans (NSM/firewalls)
- increased volume of IDS events/alerts (NSM/firewall)

Attack Patterns

Delivery:

- vulnerable UDP/TCP port used to load malware (NIDS/NIPS) communication channel established with master controller
- repeated queries to dynamic DNS names
- use URL filtering (outbound – deny access to sites) and DNS monitoring (inbound) to discover/deny attacker access
 - * if new attack, protection is built on-the-fly while the UDP port is under repair
 - * other enterprises should be warned

Attack Patterns

Exploitation:

- unexplained changes in configurations of platforms, routers or firewalls

Attack Patterns

Installation:

- DNS server is set up as a launching point for finding other vulnerable hosts
- Unusual traffic between servers that usually don't talk to one another can be detected, examined, blocked by intelligent sensors

Attack Patterns

Command and Control:

- inbound commands are sent to the exploited DNS server which returns outbound traffic and/or begins identifying other vulnerable devices within the organization to exploit.
- changes to the system show up in logs and traffic reports
- intelligent tools pick up and report on unusual connections between servers and devices, to-from locations
- types of traffic and the ports used show up in logs
- tools capture suspect traffic between the servers for further examination, including decrypting packets and examining contents, when required.
- patterns of repeated downloads, uploads or lateral movement of files is suspect and can be killed before sensitive data leaves

Attack Patterns

Mission accomplished/exfiltration of data:

- attacker controls target system, sends data outbound
- outbound traffic monitoring catches this stage of attack
- but, criminals have learned to send their data from unsuspected, even trusted servers and use low and slow bursts to try and thwart outbound protections
- advanced tools make determinations on outbound traffic based on traffic type, to-from pathways, and other patterns to detect sensitive outbound data in outbound traffic

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Example 1

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by

Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert, Rohan M. Amin,
Lockheed Martin Corporation

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Example 2

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Example 3

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